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ALGEBRAICITY AND IMPLICIT DEFINABILITY
IN SET THEORY
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS AND COLE LEAHY
Abstract. We analyze the effect of replacing several natural uses
of definability in set theory by the weaker model-theoretic notion
of algebraicity. We find, for example, that the class of hereditarily
ordinal algebraic sets is the same as the class of hereditarily ordi-
nal definable sets, that is, HOA = HOD. Moreover, we show that
every (pointwise) algebraic model of ZF is actually pointwise de-
finable. Finally, we consider the implicitly constructible universe
Imp—an algebraic analogue of the constructible universe—which
is obtained by iteratively adding not only the sets that are de-
finable over what has been built so far, but also those that are
algebraic (or equivalently, implicitly definable) over the existing
structure. While we know Imp can differ from L, the subtler prop-
erties of this new inner model are just now coming to light. Many
questions remain open.
We aim here to analyze the effect of replacing several natural uses
of definability in set theory by the weaker model-theoretic notion of
algebraicity and its companion concept of implicit definability. In place
of the class HOD of hereditarily ordinal definable sets, for example, we
consider the class HOA of hereditarily ordinal-algebraic sets. In place of
the pointwise definable models of set theory, we examine its (pointwise)
algebraic models. And in place of Go¨del’s constructible universe L,
obtained by iterating the definable power set operation, we introduce
the implicitly constructible universe Imp, obtained by iterating the
algebraic or implicitly definable power set operation. In each case we
investigate how the change from definability to algebraicity affects the
nature of the resulting concept. We are especially intrigued by Imp, a
This project began when the first author responded to a question posed by the
second author on the website MathOverflow [8]. The first author’s research has been
supported in part by National Science Foundation program grant DMS-0800762, by
Simons Foundation grant 209252, by PSC-CUNY grant 66563-00 44 and by grant
80209-06 20 from the CUNY Collaborative Incentive Award program. The authors
thank Leo Harrington for an insightful conversation with the first author during
math tea at the National University of Singapore in July of 2011. Commentary
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new inner model of ZF whose subtler properties are just now coming
to light. Open questions about Imp abound.
Before proceeding further, let us review the basic definability defini-
tions. In the model theory of first-order logic, an element a is definable
(without parameters) in a structure M if it is the unique object in M
satisfying some first-order property ϕ there, that is, if M  ϕ[b] just
in case b = a. More generally, an element a is algebraic in M if it has
a property ϕ exhibited by only finitely many objects in M , so that
{ b ∈M |M  ϕ[b] } is a finite set containing a. For each class P ⊆ M
we can similarly define what it means for an element to be P -definable
or P -algebraic by allowing the formula ϕ to have parameters from P .
Since each element of a structure M for a language with equality is
triviallyM-definable, the notion of a P -definable element is interesting
only when the inclusion P ⊆ M is proper.
In the second-order context, a subset or class A ⊆ Mn is said to be
definable in M (again without parameters, unless otherwise specified),
if A = {~a ∈M | M  ϕ[~a] } for some first-order formula ϕ. In partic-
ular, A is the unique class in Mn with 〈M,A〉  ∀~x [ϕ(~x) ↔ A(~x)], in
the language where we have added a predicate symbol for A. General-
izing this condition, we say that a class A ⊆Mn is implicitly definable
in M if there is a first-order formula ψ(A) in the expanded language,
not necessarily of the form ∀~x [ϕ(~x) ↔ A(~x)], with the property that
A is the unique class for which 〈M,A〉  ψ(A). While every (explic-
itly) definable class is thus also implicitly definable, we will see below
that the converse can fail. Generalizing even more, we say that a class
A ⊆ Mn is algebraic in M if there is a first-order formula ψ(A) in the
expanded language such that 〈M,A〉  ψ(A) and there are only finitely
many B ⊆Mn for which 〈M,B〉  ψ(B). Allowing parameters from a
fixed class P ⊆ M to appear in ψ yields the notions of P -definability,
implicit P -definability, and P -algebraicity in M . Simplifying the ter-
minology, we say that A is definable, implicitly definable, or algebraic
over (rather than in) M if it is M-definable, implicitly M-definable,
or M-algebraic in M , respectively. A natural generalization of these
concepts arises by allowing second-order quantifiers to appear in ψ.
Thus we may speak of a class A as second-order definable, implicitly
second-order definable, or second-order algebraic. Further generaliza-
tions are of course possible by allowing ψ to use resources from other
strong logics.
To begin our project, let us consider the class HOA of hereditarily or-
dinal algebraic sets. In a strong second-order theory such as KM, which
proves the existence of satisfaction classes for first-order set-theoretic
truth, we may stipulate explicitly that a set a is ordinal algebraic if it is
ALGEBRAICITY AND IMPLICIT DEFINABILITY 3
Ord-algebraic in V , that is, if for some first-order formula ϕ and ordi-
nal parameters ~α we have that ϕ(a, ~α) holds and there are only finitely
many b for which ϕ(b, ~α) holds. But because this definition invokes a
truth predicate for first-order formulas, we cannot formalize it in the
theory GBC, which does not prove the existence of such a truth pred-
icate, or in ZFC, which by Tarski’s non-definability theorem cannot
have such a truth predicate. Of course, the same problem arises with
the notion of ordinal definability, which one would like to characterize
by saying that a set a is ordinal definable if for some first-order ϕ and
ordinal parameters ~α we have that ϕ(b, ~α) holds just in case b = a. In
that case, the familiar solution is to stipulate instead that a set a is
ordinal definable if it is θ-definable in some Vθ, that is, using ordinal
parameters below θ and referring only to truth in Vθ, a set. This condi-
tion can be formalized in ZFC, and moreover (by the Le´vy–Montague
reflection theorem for first-order formulas) it is provably equivalent in
KM to the condition that a is Ord-definable in V .1 Similarly, in the
present context we shall stipulate that a set a is ordinal algebraic if it
is θ-algebraic in some Vθ. Again, this can be formalized in ZFC and
is provably equivalent in KM to the condition that a is Ord-algebraic
in V . The point is that if a is one of finitely many satisfying instances
of ϕ(·, ~α) in V , then this fact will reflect to some Vθ with θ exceeding
each of the parameters in ~α. Conversely, if a is θ-algebraic in Vθ via
ϕ(·, ~α), then because Vθ is definable from parameter θ, the object a
will be algebraic in V via ϕ(·, ~α)Vθ . Thus the collection OA of ordi-
nal algebraic sets is definable as a class in V . Likewise, then, for the
collection HOA of hereditarily ordinal algebraic sets, that is, ordinal
algebraic sets whose transitive closures contain only ordinal algebraic
sets.2
1See theorem 12.14 and equation 13.26 of [6] on reflection and ordinal definability,
respectively.
2 Nevertheless, there are some meta-mathematical subtleties to this approach.
In the case of definability, suppose a modelM believes that a is defined in VM
θ
by a
formula ϕ(·, ~α). If ϕ has standard length then, since θ 7→ VM
θ
is definable in M , we
can see externally that a is OrdM -definable inM as the unique object satisfying the
formula ϕ(·, ~α)V
M
θ with parameters ~α and θ. In fact, a remains OrdM -definable in
M even when ϕ is a nonstandard formula of M , for a is the unique object thought
by M to satisfy, in VM
θ
, the formula coded by the ordinal pϕq with parameters
coded by the ordinal p~αq. Thus OD, as defined in M by our official definition,
coincides with the class of objects in M that really are OrdM -definable in M .
For algebraicity, however, there is a wrench in the works of the analogous abso-
luteness argument: although each object that is externally OrdM -algebraic in M
is also internally ordinal algebraic in M , it is conceivable that an ω-nonstandard
model M may regard an object a as ordinal algebraic even when it is not really
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Theorem 1. The class of hereditarily ordinal algebraic sets is the same
as the class of hereditarily ordinal definable sets:
HOA = HOD.
Proof. Clearly HOD ⊆ HOA. Conversely, we show by ∈-induction that
every element of HOA is in HOD. Suppose that a ∈ HOA and assume
inductively that every element of a is in HOD, so that a ⊆ HOD. Since
a is ordinal algebraic, there is an ordinal definable set A = { a0, . . . , an }
containing it. We may assume that each ai is a subset of HOD, by
adding this condition to the definition of A. The definable well-ordering
of HOD in V gives rise to a definable bijection h : Ord→ HOD, where
h(β) is the βth element of HOD in that ordering. Thus subsets of
HOD are definably identified via h with sets of ordinals, and these
in turn are definably linearly ordered, giving rise to a definable linear
order ≺ on subsets of HOD. Namely, b ≺ c if and only if the HOD-
least element of the symmetric difference of b and c is in c, that is, if
h(min(h−1b △ h−1c)) ∈ c, where h−1x = { β | h(β) ∈ x }. Thus A is a
finite ordinal definable set with a definable linear order ≺. So each ai is
ordinal definable as the kth element of A with respect to ≺, for some k,
using the same parameters as the definition of A itself. In particular,
a is ordinal definable as desired. 
Since the foregoing proof uses the hereditary nature of HOA, it does
not seem to show OA = OD, and for now this question remains open.
Perhaps it is consistent with ZFC that some ordinal algebraic set is
not ordinal definable. Or perhaps algebraicity simply coincides with
definability in models of set theory. (Compare the previous footnote.)
We are unsure.
A second application of definability in set theory concerns pointwise
definable models, that is, structures in which each element is definable
without parameters. For example, it is well known that the minimal
transitive model of ZFC is pointwise definable, if it exists. Moreover,
every countable model of ZFC has a pointwise definable extension by
class forcing, and in fact every countable model of GBC has an ex-
tension by means of class forcing in which each set and each class is
OrdM -algebraic in M . This could happen if n were a nonstandard integer and M
regarded a as ordinal algebraic due to its membership in a set { b | VM
θ
 ϕ(b, ~α) }
of “finite” size n. In short, the more expansive concept of finiteness inside an ω-
nonstandard model M may lead it to a more generous concept of algebraicity. Of
course, since we do not yet know whether algebraicity differs from definability in
any model of set theory, we cannot now confirm this possibility by presenting a par-
ticular ω-nonstandard model M for which ODM contains sets that are not really
OrdM -algebraic in M .
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definable. Proofs of these facts and more appear in [4], which also gives
references to earlier literature on the topic.
Here we define a structure to be pointwise algebraic, or simply alge-
braic, if each of its elements is algebraic in it. In some mathematical
theories, this is not equivalent to pointwise definability. For instance,
in the language of rings {+, ·, 0, 1 }, every algebraic field extension of
the rational field is algebraic in the sense just defined, since each of its
elements is one of finitely many solutions to a particular polynomial
equation over the integers, a property expressible in this language. But
since such fields can have nontrivial automorphisms—a major focus of
Galois theory—they can fail to be pointwise definable. Set theory is
different:
Theorem 2. Every algebraic model of ZF is a pointwise definable
model of ZFC + V = HOD.
Proof. If M  ZF is algebraic, then of course each of its elements is
ordinal algebraic in the sense of M . By theorem 1, it follows that
each element of M is ordinal definable in the sense of M , and so M 
ZFC + V = HOD. But each ordinal of M , being algebraic, belongs to
a finite definable set of ordinals of M , a set that is definably linearly
ordered by the membership relation of M . So each ordinal of M is in
fact definable in M . Since M satisfies V = HOD, this implies that
every object in M is definable, and so M is pointwise definable. 
Corollary 3. An extension of ZF has an algebraic model if and only
if it is consistent with V = HOD.
Proof. In light of theorem 2, we need only prove the right-to-left di-
rection. So suppose T extends ZF and is consistent with V = HOD.
Then some M  T satisfies V = HOD. Since M thinks the universe
is definably well ordered, it has definable Skolem functions. Hence the
N ⊆ M consisting of precisely the definable elements of M is closed
under these Skolem functions and is therefore an elementary substruc-
ture ofM . So every element of N is definable in N by the same formula
that defines it inM . Therefore N  T is pointwise definable and hence
algebraic. 
Corollary 4. A complete extension of ZF has an algebraic model if
and only if it has, up to isomorphism, a unique model in which each
ordinal is definable.
Proof. By a result of Paris, a complete extension T of ZF proves V =
HOD if and only if it has, up to isomorphism, a unique model in which
each ordinal is definable. (See theorem 3.6 of [1] for a proof.) In light
of this, corollary 3 yields the desired conclusion. 
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Although theorem 2 shows that algebraicity and definability coincide
in algebraic models of set theory, we do not know whether there can
be a model of ZF with an algebraic non-definable element.
Finally, we consider the algebraic analogue of Go¨del’s constructible
universe. Go¨del builds his universe L by iterating the definable power
set operation Pdef , where for any structure M the definable power set
Pdef(M) consist of all classes A ⊆ M that are definable over M . Sim-
ilarly, we define the implicitly definable power set of M to be the col-
lection Pimp(M) of all classes A ⊆M that are implicitly definable over
M , and we define the algebraic power set of M to be the collection
Palg(M) of all A ⊆ M that are algebraic over M .
Observation 5. The algebraic power set of a structure M is identical
to its implicitly definable power set:
Palg(M) = Pimp(M).
Proof. Obviously a class A ⊆ M is algebraic over M if it is implicitly
definable over M . For the converse, suppose A ⊆ M is algebraic over
M via ϕ. Note that each of the finitely many B 6= A satisfying ϕ in M
is distinguished from A by some parameter a ∈M that is in A but not
B or vice versa. Conjoining to ϕ assertions about these parameters
(either that a ∈ A or a /∈ A, as appropriate) produces a formula ψ
witnessing that A is implicitly definable over M . 
Though algebraic classes are thus always implicitly definable, implic-
itly definable classes need not be (explicitly) definable. For example,
if M is an ω-standard model of set theory, then its full satisfaction
class SatM = { 〈pϕq,~a〉 | M  ϕ[~a] } is implicitly definable in M as the
unique class satisfying the familiar Tarskian recursive truth conditions.
But Tarski’s theorem on the non-definability of truth shows precisely
that SatM cannot be defined in M , even with parameters. It is inter-
esting to note that this argument can fail when M is ω-nonstandard,
for satisfaction classes need not be unique in such models, as shown in
[7] (see also further results in [5]).
Let us make a somewhat more attractive example, where the struc-
tureM can be ω-nonstandard and the relevant implicitly definable class
A must be amenable to M , meaning that A ∩ a ∈ M for each a ∈ M .
This is an improvement over the above example, for SatM can fail to be
amenable toM . (When SatM is amenable toM , it follows that Th(M)
is in M . But this fails, for example, in pointwise definable models of
set theory, as mentioned in [4].) For the modified argument, let N be
any model of ZFC, and let αn be the least Σn-reflecting ordinal in N ,
that is, the least ordinal such that (Vαn)
N ≺n N . Such an αn exists by
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the reflection theorem and is definable in N using the definability of Σn
satisfaction. Let Mn = (Vαn)
N and let M =
⋃
nMn be the union of the
progressively elementary chain M0 ≺0 M1 ≺1 · · · of models. Since the
union of a Σn-elementary chain is a Σn-elementary extension of each
component of the chain, we have Mn ≺n M and so M ≺ N . Note that
A = { 〈αn, pϕq,~a〉 | ~a ∈Mn, ϕ ∈ Σn, n ∈ ω,Mn  ϕ[~a] } is amenable to
M . For if a ∈ M then a ∈ Mn for some n, whence A ∩ a does not
contain any triples 〈αm, pϕq,~a〉 for m ≥ n, and consequently A ∩ a is
constructible from a and the Σn satisfaction class of Mn together with
the finitely many parameters αk for k < n, all of which are in M . Fur-
thermore, A is implicitly definable inM using a version of the Tarskian
satisfaction conditions. For any two truth predicates must agree that
each αn is least such that (Vαn)
M ≺n M , and the nonstandard formu-
las never get a chance to appear in A as we have defined Mn only for
standard n even when N (and hence M itself) is ω-nonstandard. But
A cannot be definable in M , even with parameters, since from A we
can define a truth predicate for M .
Having appreciated these facts, we introduce the algebraic analogue
of L, the implicitly constructible universe, hereby dubbed Imp and built
as follows:
Imp0 = ∅ Impα+1 = Pimp(Impα)
Impλ =
⋃
α<λ
Impα, for limit λ Imp =
⋃
α
Impα.
Theorem 6. Imp is an inner model of ZF with L ⊆ Imp ⊆ HOD.
Proof. Clearly Imp is a transitive class containing all ordinals and
closed under the Go¨del operations. Imp is almost universal as well,
for each of its subsets is included in some Impα, each of which belongs
to Imp. Any such class is an inner model of ZF.3 Since L is the least
such inner model, we therefore have L ⊆ Imp. To see that Imp ⊆ HOD,
recall from [9] that HOD is identical to the class obtained by transfinite
iteration of the second-order definable power set operation. (In other
words, HOD is just the second-order constructible universe.) Since
the second-order definable power set of a structure M includes the
implicitly definable power set Pimp(M), the inclusion Imp ⊆ HOD is
immediate. One can also obtain this inclusion by transfinite induction:
if Impα ⊆ HOD and A ∈ Impα+1, then A is implicitly definable over
Impα by a specific formula with parameters from Impα, and since these
3See theorem 13.9 of [6] for a definition of almost universality and a proof that
any almost universal transitive class containing all ordinals and closed under the
Go¨del operations is a model of ZF.
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parameters and Impα are ordinal definable, it follows that A is ordinal
definable as the unique subset of Impα that is implicitly defined by that
formula from those parameters. That is, although A is only implicitly
definable as a subset of Impα, this fact serves as a first-order definition
of A as an element of V . 
We are unsure whether Imp must satisfy the axiom of choice. This is
related to the subtle issue of whether ImpImp = Imp, that is, whether
Imp can see that it is Imp. If so then Imp would know that ImpImp ⊆
HOD and so would satisfy the statement V = HOD, which implies the
axiom of choice. In essence, if Imp can see that it is Imp, then it can
define a well-ordering of the universe: one set precedes another when
it appears earlier in the Imp hierarchy or at the same time but with a
smaller formula, or with the same formula but with earlier parameters.
Unfortunately, we do not know whether ImpImp = Imp must hold. To
highlight a difficulty, note that one might aim to prove ImpImp = Imp
by showing inductively that it is true in a level-by-level manner, that
is, by proving ImpImpα = Impα for each α. Of course, if this identity
holds at α then Impα+1 ⊆ Imp
Imp
α+1, because any A ∈ Impα+1 will be
implicitly definable over ImpImpα and contained in Imp, and so it will
be in ImpImpα+1. But the problem for the converse is that perhaps some
B ⊆ ImpImpα , belonging not to Impα but still belonging to some later
stage Impβ, will be implicitly definable over Impα in the sense of Imp
but not in the sense of V . This will happen, for example, if V 6= Imp
and every formula witnessing in Imp that B is implicitly definable over
Impα is satisfied in V also by some set other than B. So we seem not
to be able to argue that ImpImpα+1 ⊆ Impα+1, and the inductive method
of showing ImpImp = Imp therefore appears to break down.
Putting that aside for the moment, let us examine the relationship
between Imp and L. Observe first that for any countable structure
M , the statement that A ⊆ M is implicitly definable over M is a Π11
assertion in the codes for A and M . Shoenfield absoluteness there-
fore ensures that Impα is absolute from V to L for α < ω
L
1 , and so
ImpωL
1
= (Impω1)
L = LωL
1
. Meanwhile, the Impα hierarchy grows
faster than the Lα hierarchy. For as noted above, the satisfaction class
{ 〈pϕq,~a〉 | Impα  ϕ[~a] } is implicitly, but not explicitly, definable over
Impα. Furthermore, the satisfaction class for hyperarithmetic truth is
in Pimp(Impω) = Impω+1 but does not appear in L until stage ω
CK
1 .
The satisfaction relation for Lκ,λ logic over Impα, using formulas in
Impα, is likewise implicitly definable in Impα. One naturally wonders
whether the Lα hierarchy ever catches up to the Impα hierarchy, in the
sense that each Impα is contained in some Lβ . Not necessarily:
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Theorem 7. It is relatively consistent with ZFC that Imp 6= L.
Proof. Let T be a Souslin tree in L with the unique branch property, a
strong notion of rigidity described in [2]. Forcing over L with T yields
a model L[b] containing exactly one cofinal branch b through T . Since
T ∈ L, there is an α with T ∈ ImpL[b]α . And in Imp
L[b]
α the formula “X is
a cofinal branch through T” is satisfied uniquely by b. So b ∈ Imp
L[b]
α+1.
But b /∈ L. So L[b] thinks Imp 6= L. 
Corollary 8. Imp is not absolute to forcing extensions.
A careful inspection of the proof of theorem 7 shows that a copy of
T becomes definable in ImpL[b]ω1 , and so in fact b ∈ Imp
L[b]
ω1+1. Moreover,
the branch b is implicitly definable over L inside any universe in which
b is isolated in T . In general, we would like to know what else is
contained in Pimp(L). For example, is 0
♯, considered as a set of natural
numbers, implicitly definable over L? Can any non-constructible real
be implicitly definable over L?
Refining the notion of implicit constructibility captured by Imp, we
define the class gImp, the generic implicitly constructible universe, to
consist of those sets a that belong to ImpV [G] for every set-forcing
extension V [G] of the universe. This class is first-order definable in V .
One can compare gImp with the generic HOD class gHOD, an inner
model of ZFC defined in [3]. Since the proof of theorem 6 works in
each forcing extension, we note that gImp ⊆ gHOD.
Theorem 9. In any set-forcing extension L[G] of L, there is a further
extension L[G][H ] with gImpL[G][H] = ImpL[G][H] = L.
Proof. Let L[G][H ] be the forcing extension obtained by absorbing the
G forcing into a large collapse Coll(ω, θ) forcing that is almost homo-
geneous. Since L is the HOD of L[G][H ], it follows that gImpL[G][H] =
ImpL[G][H] = L as well. 
Open questions about Imp abound. Can ImpImp differ from Imp?
Does Imp satisfy the axiom of choice? Can Imp have measurable car-
dinals? Must 0♯ be in Imp when it exists?4 Which large cardinals are
absolute to Imp? Does Imp have fine structure? Should we hope for any
condensation-like principle? Can CH or GCH fail in Imp? Can reals
be added at uncountable construction stages of Imp? Can we separate
Imp from HOD? How much can we control Imp by forcing? Can we
4An affirmative answer arose in conversation with Menachem Magidor and
Gunter Fuchs, and we hope that Imp will subsume further large cardinal features.
We anticipate a future article on the implicitly constructible universe.
10 JOEL DAVID HAMKINS AND COLE LEAHY
put arbitrary sets into the Imp of a suitable forcing extension? What
can be said about the universe Imp(R) of sets implicitly constructible
relative to R and, more generally, about Imp(X) for other sets X? Here
we hope at least to have aroused interest in these questions.
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